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Abstract: The concept of session, the context under which a user accesses 
resources is very important to apply access control. We present first a pattern 
for describing access sessions, and we combine it with two existing access 
control patterns to define session-based versions of them. First we consider a 
pattern for Session-Based Role-Based Access Control for organizations in 
which job functions form the basis for privilege assignments and then, a 
Session-Based Attribute-Based Access Control pattern for organizations in 
which accesses should be controlled based on values of user attributes and 
object properties. We emphasize the effect of using sessions on those models.  
     
 
1. Introduction 
It is important to develop systems where security has been considered at all stages of design, which 
not only satisfy their functional specifications but also satisfy security requirements. To do this we 
need to start with high-level models that represent the security policies of the institution. There are 
three models currently used by most systems: the access matrix, the Role-Based Access Control 
(RBAC) model, and the multilevel model. 
 
One of the first security models was the access matrix. The basic access matrix [Lam71] included the 
tuple {s,o,t}, where s indicates a subject or active entity, o is the protected object or resource, and t 
indicates the type of access permitted. [Har76] proved security properties of this model using the so-
called HRU (Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman) model. In that model users are allowed to delegate their rights 
(discretionary property, delegatable authorization), implying a tuple {s,o,t,f}, where f is a Boolean 
copy flag indicating if the right is allowed to be delegated or not. A predicate was added to the basic 
rule to allow content-based authorization [Fer75], becoming {s,o,t,p,f}, where p is the predicate (the 
predicate could also include environment variables). Patterns for the basic rule and for the tuple 
{s,o,t,p,f} were given in [Fer01a, Sch06]. The rule could also include the concept of Authorizer (a), 
becoming {a,s,o,t,p,f} [Fer81] (Explicitly Granted Authorization). RBAC [San96] can be considered 
a special interpretation of the basic authorization model, where subjects are roles instead of individual 
users. We presented two varieties of RBAC patterns in [Fer01a] and [Sch06]. Subsequently, several 
variations and extensions of these models have appeared. We presented a variation called Metadata-
Based Access Control, which later we renamed Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) [Pri04, 
Pri05].  
 
ABAC can be seen in two ways: 
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• A specialization of the model {s,o,t,p}, where p is a predicate which depends on attribute 
values.  
• A variant where s and o are defined by descriptors which depend on attribute values. 
 
In this paper we present a general pattern for Access Session as a building block and two patterns for 
RBAC and ABAC making use of the Access Session pattern, the Session-Based RBAC and the 
Session-Based ABAC pattern.  Sessions describe an environment where the rights available to a user 
can be dynamically limited based on the context in which the user is acting. The pattern diagram of 
Figure 1 shows the relationships between these patterns. For example, adding a condition to Basic 
Authorization results in Content-Based Authorization, using the concept of session results in session-
based models, and so on. Note that RBAC is in general, not delegatable. All these patterns define 
authorization rules and they need a reference monitor for their enforcement; we don’t show it in this 
diagram for simplicity (see [Sch06] for the corresponding pattern). The double-lined patterns are the 
ones presented here. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                            Figure 1. Relationships between access control patterns 
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2. Access Session  
 
Provide a context in which a security subject can access resources. Depending on the context he is 
using, the rights of a user may vary.  
 
2.1 Example 
 John is a developer in a project. He is also a project leader in another project. As a project leader he 
can evaluate the performance of the members of his project. He combines his two functions and adds 
several flattering evaluations about himself in the project where he is a developer. Later his manager 
thinking that they came from the project leader of that project, gives John a big bonus.  
 
2.2 Context 
Any system supporting access control to its resources. Access control should be flexible, in the sense 
that access rights depend on the context in which the user is acting. 
 
2.3 Problem 
A given user may be authorized to access a system by performing several roles. However, for a 
particular access only those privileges (roles) should be active which are necessary to perform the 
intended task. This is an application of the principle of least-privilege and necessary to prevent the 
user from misusing the system (intentionally, accidentally by performing an error, or without 
knowledge and tricked to do so, for example through a Trojan Horse attack). Additionally this would 
potentially restrict damage in case of session hijacking. A successfully attacking process would not 
have all privileges of a user available but only the active subset. 
 
The following forces will affect the solution: 
• Subjects may have many rights directly or indirectly through their execution contexts or roles. 
Using all of them at one time may result in conflicts of interest and security violations. We need to 
restrict the use of those rights depending on the application or task the subject is performing. 
 
• In the context of an interaction we can make the access to some functions implicit, thus facilitating 
the use of the system and preventing errors that may result on vulnerabilities. For example, some 
editors or other tools could be implicitly available in some sessions. 
 
• It is not convenient to make subjects reauthenticate every time they request a new resource. Once 
the subject is authenticated, this condition should remain valid during the whole session. 
 
2.4 Solution 
Define a unit of interaction, a session, which has a limited lifetime, e.g. between login and logoff of a 
user or between the beginning and the end of a transaction. When a user logs on and after 
authentication, the session activates some execution contexts with only a subset of the authorizations 
she possesses. It should be the minimal subset which is needed for the user or transaction to perform 
the intended task. Only those rights are available within the session. A subject can be in several 
sessions at the same time; however, in every session only the necessary rights are active. 
 
Structure 
Figure 2 shows the class model of the Access Session pattern. Classes Subject and Sesssion have the 
obvious meaning. The class ExecutionContext contains the set of active rights that the user may use 
within the session.  
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Figure 2: Class model for Access Session pattern 
 
Dynamics 
 
Figure 3 shows the use case Open (Activate) a session. A subject logs on using some of his contexts 
and the logon interface authenticates the subject. The box indicates some authentication dialog or 
protocol. After the subject is authenticated, the interface creates a session object and returns a handle 
to the subject.  
 
2.5 Implementation 
Based on institution and application policies define which contexts (implying specific rights) should 
be used in each task and associate them with the corresponding session. The rights should be selected 
using the least privilege principle.  
 
2.6 Example resolved 
When John logs on the project where he is a developer he only gets the rights for a developer and 
cannot add evaluations. When he logs on in the project where he is a project leader he can only 
evaluate the members of his group. Now he only gets legitimate evaluations.  
 
2.7 Known uses 
• Session Access is part of the RBAC standard proposal by NIST which later has been adopted by 
the American National Standards Institute,  International Committee for Information Technology 
Standards (ANSI/INCITS) as ANSI INCITS 359-2004 [Fer01b]. 
• Multics [Sum97] used execution contexts to limit access rights. 
• Session Access is implemented in the security module CSAP [Dri03] of the Webocrat System in 
conjunction with an RBAC policy. 
 
Subject ExecutionContext
Session
* *
*
*
1
1inSession
hasContexts
{subset}
activeInSession
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                        Figure 3. Sequence diagram for use case ‘Open a session’ 
 
2.8 Consequences 
This pattern has the following advantages: 
• We can give to each context only the needed rights according to its function and we can invoke in 
a session only those contexts that are needed for a given task. 
• We can exclude combinations of contexts that might result in possible access violations or 
conflicts of interest. 
• Once a subject starts a session it doesn’t have to be reauthenticated. Its status is kept by the 
session. 
 
A possible disadvantage:  
If we need to apply fine-grained access it might be inefficient to open many sessions to perform 
complex activities. 
 
2.9 Related patterns 
The Access Session pattern is used in the Session-Based RBAC and ABAC patterns, discussed later.  
 
The Session pattern of [Yod97] created a session object that defined a namespace to hold all the 
variables that need to be referenced by many objects. P. Sommerlad remade this pattern as a Security 
Session [Sch06], intended to prevent a user to be reauthenticated every time he accesses a new object. 
<<actor>>
:Subject :logonInterface
:Session
logon (subject, context)
returnSession (session)
authentication
create (session)
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A pattern with a similar objective is Abstract Session [Pry00]: When an object's services are invoked 
by clients, the server object may have to maintain state for each client. The server creates a session 
object that encapsulates state information for the client. The server returns a pointer to the session 
object. However, none of these patterns considers limitation of rights. Our pattern is an extension of 
those patterns emphasizing the effect of a session as a limiter of rights.  
 
3. Session-Based Role-Based Access Control 
 
Allow access to resources based on the role of the subject and limit the rights that can be applied at a 
given time based on the contexts (roles) defined by the access session. 
 
3.1 Example 
Lisa is a secretary in a medical organization but sometimes she helps in the laboratory to perform 
patient tests. As a secretary she has access to patients’ information such as name, address, SSN, etc. 
This is necessary so she can bill them and their insurance companies. In the lab she has access to 
anonymized patient test results. Combining her two roles she can associate test results to names, 
which violates patient privacy.  
 
3.2 Context 
Any environment where we need to control access to computing resources and where users can be 
classified according to their jobs or their tasks. 
 
3.3 Problem 
In an organization a user may play several roles. However, for each access the user must act only 
within the authorizations of a single role (i.e. within the context of the role) or combinations of roles 
that do not violate institution policies. How to restrict subjects to follow the policies of the 
institution? 
 
The following forces apply to the solution: 
• People in institutions have different needs for access to information, according to their functions. 
They may have several roles associated with specific functions or tasks. 
• We want to help the institution to define precise access rights for its members according to a 
need-to-know policy. 
• Users may have more than one role and we may want to enforce policies such as separation of 
duty, where a user cannot be in two or more specific roles in the same session. 
 
3.4 Solution 
A subject may have several roles. Each role collects the rights that a user can activate at a given 
moment (execution context), while a session controls the way of using roles and can enforce role 
exclusion at execution time.  
 
Structure 
The structure of the session-based RBAC is shown in the class diagram given in Figure 4. The class 
Role is an intermediary between subject and object holding all authorizations a user possesses while 
playing the role and acts here as an execution context. Within a Session, only a subset of the roles 
assigned to a Subject may be activated, i.e. only those necessary to perform the intended task. Roles 
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may be composed according to a Composite pattern [Gam94], where higher-level roles inherit rights 
from the lower-level roles. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   Figure 4.  Class model for the Session-Based RBAC  
 
3.5 Implementation 
See Section 5 for an example of a real implementation. 
 
• Determine the roles the system should contain (role catalog), according to the user functions or 
tasks. 
• Collect lists of incompatible roles and use them when a session is started (static constraints). 
These constraints can be defined using OCL or some other formal language. 
• Determine the number of roles which may be active within a session (dynamic constraints). 
• When a user opens a session she must declare what roles she intends to use and the system will 
open the corresponding session or refuse to do so in case of conflicts. 
 
3.6 Example resolved  
Lisa can log on a secretary or as a lab assistant but she cannot combine these roles. Now she cannot 
relate results to patient names.  
 
3.7 Known uses 
Subject Role
Session
* *
*
*
1
1inSession
hasRoles
{subset}
activeInSession
Object
Right
accessType
* *
Simple
Role
Composite
Role
*
isAuthorizedFor
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The structure and dynamics of the session-based RBAC as given above are implemented in the 
security module CSAP [Dri03] of the Webocrat system. Webocrat is a portal supporting E-
Democracy which was developed within the European Webocracy project (FP5-IST-1999-20364) 
between 2000-2003.    
 
Views in relational databases can de used to define sets of rights. Controlling the use of views by 
roles can control the use of rights in sessions. This is done for example in Oracle and DB2, where 
SQL can be used to define restricted views [Elm03].  
 
3.8 Consequences 
Among the advantages of this pattern we have: 
• Users can activate more than one session at a time for functional flexibility (some tasks may 
require multiple roles). 
• Fine-grained rights can be assigned to roles to enforce a need-to-know policy. 
• We can exclude roles that violate institution policies when a session is open.  
 
Possible disadvantages include: 
• Additional conceptual complexity to define which roles can be used together and which should be 
mutually exclusive.  
 
3.9 Related patterns 
This pattern is a combination of the Session pattern described earlier and the RBAC pattern [Sch06]. 
As indicated earlier, structuring of roles can be represented by a Composite pattern. 
 
 
4. Session-Based Attribute-Based Authorization  
 
Allow access to resources based on the attributes of the subjects and the properties of the objects but 
limit the rights that can be applied at a given time based on the context defined by the access session. 
 
4.1 Example  
Meili is a teenager who likes movies and subscribes to several movie services through the Internet. 
She logs in a central portal where she can reach sets of movies. Sometimes she gets movies that she 
finds offensive or inappropriate (pornographic, racist, plain stupid). She doesn’t have much time to 
read details about the movies in advance and some of them don’t even have good descriptions so 
reading about the movies is not a good approach. She would like some kind of filter according to her 
characteristics and her preferences. Also the portal may be breaking the law in making available to 
her some of these movies. 
 
4.2 Context 
Dynamic systems supporting a large set of objects and subjects in which the structure of the subjects 
changes rapidly, such as web-based information systems, e-government and e-business portals. In this 
environment there is the need to control access to computing resources and the subjects may not be 
preregistered. We want to give access to resources based on characteristics of the subjects such as 
groups to which they belong, company for which they work, biological characteristics such as age, 
etc.  
 
4.3 Problem 
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As indicated access may depend on the age or other attributes of a user. In this case, privilege 
assignments to the user cannot not be done statically by a security administrator but automatically by 
the system based on the value of some of the attributes, e.g. “DateOfBirth” . As the user gets older or 
changes functions his authorization state changes automatically. Access rights might even depend on 
an external attribute, such as “physical location” of a user in a mobile environment. In this case the 
authorization state changes automatically when the user moves around. At the subject’s side, 
metadata such as the scope of a document, or the MPAA rating of a movie are examples of 
properties. All these constraints can be applied through predicates in the rules [Fer81], but it is 
difficult to have a variety of prepackaged rules for the typical cases. 
 
The solution is constrained by the following forces: 
• We need to limit the rights of subjects that belong to a variety of groups, roles, or have special 
attributes. Unrestricted access might allow policy or law violations.  
• This control should not imply an extra burden for the security administrator. 
• This control should not imply a significant performance overhead. 
• The environment is very dynamic and changes should be easy to make. 
 
4.4 Solution 
Access rights are based on the comparison of values of selected attributes of subjects and properties 
of objects (so called subject and object descriptors). In this pattern descriptors are a construct to 
somehow “group” objects and subjects dynamically, not explicitly by an administrator but implicitly 
by their attribute or property values. This grouping may result in unpredictable sets of rights that may 
violate security policies. A session delimits the rights that can be applied at a given moment; that is, 
the subject attributes define a context for access rights. . 
 
Structure 
Figure 5 shows the class diagram for the solution. A Subject Descriptor is formed by applying 
Qualifiers to Attribute Values. A Session selects some specific values as execution context that 
defines the Subject rights.  
 
4.5 Implementation 
See Section 5 for an example of a real implementation. 
 
1) Select an appropriate package to convey the subject’s credentials including attributes. Examples 
would be attribute certificates [Mor06, Opp00] or Kerberos tickets. 
 
2) Select an implementation to express the object’s attributes. Candidates could be standards on meta-
data resource discovery, such as the Dublin Core Metadata Initiative [DCM]. 
 
3) Define an enforcement mechanism for the rights defined in contexts. See for example [Cor04]. 
 
4.6 Example resolved 
The portal implemented an ABAC model. Now when Meili opens a session she is given access to 
contexts with sets of preselected movies according to her preferences and restricted according to legal 
aspects and to the services she has paid for.  
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Figure 5. Class model for the Session-Based ABAC pattern 
 
4.7 Known Uses 
Session-based ABAC is implemented as an alternative to RBAC in the security module CSAP 
[Dri03] of the Webocrat system. A similar pattern is also used in the authorization system of the 
.NET component framework [LaM02] and in AAIs (authentication and authorization infrastructures), 
such as Permis [Cha03] and Shibboleth [Shi].  
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The XML standard XACML [Del05, OAS03] uses attributes of subjects and objects for the 
specification of access control policies. As shown in the UCONABC [Par04], ABAC may also have 
potential for digital rights management.  
 
4.8 Consequences 
The advantages of this pattern include: 
• The rights of subjects that belong to a variety of groups, roles, or have special attributes can be 
limited by restricting them to use specific contexts selected by sessions.  
• This control does not imply an extra burden for the security administrator because the contexts 
can be defined by application designers according to application policies. 
• This control does not imply a significant performance overhead because changing from one 
context to another just means changing a set of rights. 
• Changes in access restrictions can be easily accommodated by defining new contexts or deleting 
existing contexts. 
 
4.9 Related patterns 
Figure 1 shows the relationship of this pattern to other access control patterns. As indicated 
credentials such as certificates are frequently used to request access [Mor06]. 
 
 
5. Using session-based access control as a service 
 
In this section we show by means of two sequence diagrams how the patterns described above can be 
embedded into a general authentication, authorization and access control service. Such a service can 
be called by any application or process having the need to authenticate the users and to provide 
session-based access control. In the following it is assumed that the service provides both session-
based RBAC and session-based ABAC and the client application requesting the service must chose 
between the two. 
 
Figure 6 shows a sequence diagram for the interaction of a requesting client process and the session-
based access control service. In order to hide the complexity of the subsystems, in the sequence 
diagram we use the Facade pattern [Gam94] as a uniform interface for calling applications. 
 
In order to be able to access a resource, a valid session object must be requested by the calling 
application (or user process). This starts with some sort of initialization process during which the 
client application first requests from the authentication facade of the security service an 
authentication service. In the example shown in figure 6 a password service is returned but also other 
services may be available. Second is the request for an authorization service. In the example RBAC is 
returned, and the initialization phase is finished. Next is the actual user authentication, role selection 
and the session establishment. During user authentication the client application provides to the 
password service <user-id, pwd>. The password service interacts with a userDM and in case of 
successful log-in a user object is created and a reference to the object (aUser) is returned to the calling 
client application.  
 
A valid session can only be established in the case the user application activates at least one role from 
the set of possible roles for the user. This starts by calling the method getAssignedRoles of the user 
object. In case of a valid userID all available roles for a particular user are determined and returned 
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by the role data module (RoleDM) and for each role a transient role object is created by the RBAC 
service. Next from the set of possible roles the user selects a subset and the RBAC service calls the 
corresponding method to activate the roles.  
 
At this stage the user object is authenticated and has a set of active roles assigned. These are the only 
prerequisites for establishing a session. After receiving the request the session service creates a valid 
session object for which the session-id is returned as a reference for the calling client process. Under 
a valid session-id the client may act under the context of the session by using the privileges of the 
selected roles. 
 
Figure 6.  Session establishment 
 
 
 
Figure 7 shows an attempt of a client process to access a resource within a valid session. The process 
starts with calling the method checkAccess with parameters session-id, object-id, operation, i.e. a 
request of a user wishing to access a certain object by using a predefined operation and this all within 
the context of an established session.  First, the validity of the session is checked, then the session 
object is used by the RBACService in order to get the user’s active roles within this session. Next, the 
user’s permissions are determined by retrieving all the permissions assigned to the active roles. 
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Finally, the RBACService checks whether there is a permission for the tuple <object, operation>. In 
the case there is one, the access will be granted, otherwise denied. 
 
Figure 7.  Permission approval 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
We have shown patterns to describe the effect of sessions on access control models. We presented 
first the Access Session, which describes the basic concept of session as a limiter of rights. We then 
combined this pattern with the patterns of two access control models to show its effect on them. 
Finally we showed an example of a system using the last two patterns as a way to illustrate a real 
implementation.  
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